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CHAPTER I 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Method is the cry of our age. Whether enjoying leisure or engaged 
in labor or learning, we always are on the alert for method. We are nearly 
as interested in HOW a man does a thing as in WHAT he does. Youth not only 
admires the wondrous teats of its favori1;e hero-athletes, but studies their 
technique tor home-run hitting and backhand drives on the cereal boxes which 
adorn the breaktast table. Efficiency experts are introducing system into 
our offices and factories to the great advantage of industry, for system 
saves time, energy, and money. Even the seekers after wisdom have not es-
caped tram this interest. Research students are prepared tor success in 
their field by drill in method, whether historical, scientific, or philosophi-
cal. And teachers, who of old were rated according to their learning, now 
are not ranked among the best until they have mastered the methods of teaching 
Though this interest in method is more pronounced in our own day, 
it is by no means the result of a new discovery, for method dates back to the 
days of Socrates, as we shall see. But before we go into the history of meth-
od, it seems proper to examine whether the study of method is deserving of 
the attention which it receives. 
Far tram being a waste of time, this study of method holds great 
profit for us, for without knowing "HOW" we can not hope, except by chance, 
to improve our ability in any field. Particularly is this true in the 
sciences, our particular interest in this thesis. (Science is here to be 
taken in the proper sense of knowing a thing in its causes. and is not 
limited. therefore to mere physical science.) Method and science have ever 
been associated inseparably. for method is the vehicle of science. Just as 
a vehicle is a great help to the traveler on his aourney. so method helps 
science on its way towards truth. 
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Method is defined in logic books as "a syste.m of right procedure 
for the attainment of truth. " Syste.m always denotes a fixed and definite 
series of steps towards an end; it denotes the order of acts one must follow 
in order to assure the easiest, or quickest, or most certain arrival at one's 
objective. In science, as the definition declares, the objective of method 
is the attainment of truth. Now a man can attain truth either by his own 
unassisted efforts or by the instruction of another, and in either case suc-
ceeds best if method is used. Sometimes the method is the same for both re-
search and instruction because of the natural connection between investiga-
tion and instruction. In the one case the student works out a. problem in-
dependently. In the other he solves a problem with the aid of a. teacher, 
who outlines the steps leading to the solution. The method which serves this 
twofold function is of double value in science. 
An example will illustrate what is meant by method and will be a. 
convincing proof of its value for getting a.t the truth. A sophomore in high 
school receives his first introduction to Caesar and translation. ~he teacher~ 
if he is a master of his art • begins the work by showing the student how to 
translate a sentence, how to look first for the verb, then for its subject 
and its object, then for modifying words, phrases, and clauses. The scheme 
is simple yet definite. and by frequent practice the student acquires it as 
a ha.bi t • and therewith facility in reading his Caesar; by this device he finds 
Vihat he is searching tor_ the meaning of sentences and paragraphs; in short 
he finds the truth. (Not that we wish to contuse facility in reading Latin 
with mere introductory and mechanical method. Facility in reading is rather 
a result of the regular use of this method. From it is acquired the Latin 
habit_ distinct fran the English, of seeing a longe the relationship of words_ 
whereas in English relationships are indicated almost immediately.) On the 
other hand, if a lad has never been taught the proper manner of translating,. 
or if by his own fault he has never practised it, he may bungle along for year 
without acquiring any proficiency in reading, and at the end of his course be 
able to make sense out of his Virgil and Cicero, or even Caesar, only with 
the help of a slavish translation. He fails in the purpose of his study 
because he has no method. 
Furthermore this same method serves as a means of instruction as 
well as of discovery. If the student is required to help one of his troubled 
classmates, his clearest means of . explanation will be to renew the steps by 
which he arrived at the translation. He will point out the verb, its subject, 
object, and modifiers. When asked to explain a difficult word_ he will then 
relate the facts about the word according to the steps, determined by con-
vention and good sense, which he took to arrive at them. If this word is a 
noun, he will give the declension,gender, number, and case, and the reason 
for its case. In other words, this exposition institutes in the mind of his 
hearer the same process of investigation as was carried on in his own mind. 
That the Socratic method possesses this twofold value for investi-
gation and instruction will be established in Chapters III and IV. For the 
present we turn to history for still further proof of the value of method in 
general. 
..... 
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In the ages of greatest progress in philosophy, method has been 
most flourishing. The philosophy of Greece reached it apex in Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle, who alone of those early philosophers had a very exact 
notion of method. After Aristotle, method and philosophy declined together, 
proving that method, even though it is of itself insufficient without the aid 
of genius to produce preeminence in philosophy, nevertheless is a necessary 
help to philosophical preeminence. In a later age when philosophy once more 
shook off its torpor by the genius ·Of the •~holastics, method became more 
clearly defined in exact proportion to the progress of philosophy. With 
Abelard, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, philosophy and method im-
proved more and more, until they reached their apogee in St. Thomas Aquinas. 
st. Thomas • method has became synon~ous with the scholastic method, by which 
scholasticism has been kept alive and vigorous whenever followed with exacti• 
tude. The decline of scholasticimn would not have taken place in the four-
teenth century had not philosophers allowed the scholastic method to degene-
rate into mere formalism. Formalism, it is to be observed, is that corrup-
tion of right method whereby the weight of emphasis is placed on correct 
procedure rather than on the object of method, the discovery of truth. The 
fourteenth century scholastics foolishly turned their attention fran this 
principal function of method to a secondary function, its eristic possibili-
ties. They no longer sought to find truth but to win arguments. 
The greatest service has been rendered to the physical sciences, 
also bymethodJ namely, the scientific method. The rapid progress made in 
physics and chemistry as soon as the scientific method was generally applied 
proves its value to these sciences. The scientific method has raised chem-
istry :fr<m1 the superstitions of alchemy, has saved physics tram blundering 
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gue .. sses, has made our age outstanding for its discoveries, machinery, indus-
try, and modern conveniences. 
Such is the value of method. What then is its origin? Same sort of 
method has always existed among scholars, for man as a rational being natur-
ally chooses means to an end. But the excellence of these means depends 
upon the competence of the man choosing them and upon the tradition he in-
herits tram his predecessors. Wherefore, because of the want of genius and 
tradition, science lacked a well developed method until the time of Socrates. 
When Thales proposed his famous question, "What is the one thi~ 
the world is made of?" there was no dearth of philosophizing on the point, 
and no dearth of divergent answers. Thales himself thought the ultimate 
constituent was water. ...... .Anaxim.enes said it was lTV tllj.w<., air; Pythagoras said 
number; and Heraclitus said fire. But they had no method for settling the 
question, for they arrived at the answers for the most part by guess work. 
They posited their hypotheses on a very superficial consideration of sense 
data. They had no means of checking up on their conclusions, no way of 
proving their awn theory, or of disproving conflicting theories. Without 
same salutary method their theories seemed as plausible as their. lungs were 
strong and their repetitions frequent. 
The assumption of Thales that all things are one later on led to 
further speculation about the one and the many. In defense of Thales' as-
sumption, Par.menides enuntiated his dilemma, "Ex ente non fit ens, neque 
ex non-ente. Ergo ens non mutatur. Ergo est unum. n l!lnpedocles held the 
opposite, that being is multiple, that the earth is composed of four elements 
earth, air, fire, and water. In the logical reasoning of Par.menides we de-
t~ the beginnings of method, and we have Plato's own authority for it that 
Par.menides used a method, an argument tram exclusion, which in the dialogue 
Par.menides he is represented as teaching to Socrates. Another early philo-
sopher who had an idea of method is Zeno, a younger contemporary of Parmen-
ides, whan Aristotle called the originator of dialectic.l But method was 
not yet sufficiently developed among these men to settle the question of the 
one and the many, and, as a result, various schools were at loggerheads, 
philosophy stagnated, and gradually fell into disrepute. 
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Disgusted with the seeming uselessness of these philosophic 
squabbles, the sophists initiated a new kind of learning, of which they were 
the teachers, the art of making one's way. Now this utilitarian education 
was based on the principle that truth is relative, a conclusion which the 
sophists drew tram the uncertainty of preceding philosophers' theories. 
However, since the sophists deserted speculation, they contributed nothing to 
speculative method. But they did add something to expository method in their 
development of rhetoric and dialectic. 
Socrates, however, by his inquisitiveness and acquisitiveness, 
tram talking with the philosophers Parmenides and Zeno, tram association with 
the sophists, learned and evaluated all that was known at the time about 
philosophical method. He did not care for the problems of the early philo-
sophers, but was interested in the ethical questions of the sophists, though 
he disagreed with their scepticism; above all, he clearly saw that philo-
sophical speculation of any sort requires a method. Fran the Eleatics, Par-
menides and Zeno, he drew what help he could, and then set out to formulate 
his own method. He succeeded and gave philosophy new vigor by providing it 
with a definite means of investigating problems, drawing conclusions, and 
testing them. All previous methods had been fragmentary and vague, by no 
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means well defined or complete like the method of Socrates. Realizing that 
his method was valuable. and seeing the necessity of it in philosophy. he 
taught it with insistence to his disciples. declaring that if he knew nothing 
else. he did know the right way of searching for truth. 
The disciple most capable of appreciating Socrates' method was 
Plato. In addition to being of kindred genius with Socrates. Plato conceived 
the deepest esteem for his master. Moved by admiration of the man. Plato 
preserved in his works an accurate portrait or Socrates' character; in ad-
miration of his philosophy and method. Plato recorded Socrates' unwritten 
doctrines and means of procedure. Not only in the early dialogues. where he 
delineates the character and doctrine or Socrates. but in many of his later 
dialogues. Plato employs the Socratic method• for he realized it value for 
his own advanced study. Plato did not stop investigating where Socrates had 
stopped. but went on to consider problems untouched by Socrates. especially 
the question of reality. Moreover. when Plato set down his conclusions and 
discoveries in writing. he saw in the Socratic method a valuable expository 
device. suited for rendering abstruse subject matter interesting. forceful. 
and clear. It is the dramatic dialogue which has made Plato famous as a man 
of letters as well as a philosopher. 
Here then is the history of the development of a philosophical 
. 
method among the Greeks. Without a definite method. the pre-Socratics came 
to a deadlock. and philosophy became retrogressive instead of progressive. 
The sophists contributed little more to the development of method than a 
stimulus to the study of dialectic. Socrates. insisting on the necessity 
of method. himself formulated from the previous beginning a complete and 
finished method. And finally.whereas Socrates had been largely concerned with 
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developing and popularizing his method. Plato proved its value in extensive 
research. establishing by its aid his own system of philosophy. 
It remains now to be seen just what the Socratic method is and why 
it is of such great importance to the pursuit of knowledge. This chapter may 
well be concluded with M.E.J.Taylor's tribute to the Socratic method: 
In the application of his method of attaining knowledge Socrates 
had confined himself to arriving at clear conceptions of the meani~ 
of moral terms. But in the method itself there was nothing to ne-
cessitate this limitation. The attainment of clear and consistent 
conceptions is the way of knowledge not only in regard to morals 
but in every department of truth. This is one direction in which 
Socraticism widened out into Platonism. The search for truth is 
no longer confined to the truth that bears on human life. The 
method of Socrates must be applied to the whole range of human 
knowledge.2 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
1. Aristotle, Sophists, {ap. Diogenes Laertius, ix, 25) 
2. Taylor, M.E.J., Greek Philosophy, P• 86 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
In the last chapter we saw the development o£ logical method among 
the early philosophers and its culmination in the method o£ Socrates. In 
this chapter we shall consider the nature and peculiarities of his method and 
formulate for ourselves a definition o£ it. 
It is to be noted that it is,not our purpose in this chapter to 
consider ~uestions closely related to the Socratic method, which do not per-
tain directly to our problem. Hence it is not our concern whether Plato im-
proved on the method as he received it :fram his master; nor again to consider 
Plato's development o£ Socrates' philosophical doctrines; not the validity o£ 
'" 
these doctrines. Nor shall we even treat o£ the whole o£ the logical system 
of Plato, i.e., his theory o£ cognition and his theory of ideas. But we shall 
confine our considerations to the logic o£ the method which he employed, de-
fining, analyzing, and explaining it; and attempting to give sane idea of the 
plan which Socrates followed in his method of questioning, the principles on 
which it is based, and, in later chapters, the value of this method. 
In seeking to define the Socratic method, how better may we start 
than by doing just what Socrates himself would have done in a similar situa-
tion? He would have begun by collecting what he and his listeners already 
knew about the matter, thus forming a tentative theory, and then testing it 
with careful reasoning. So plumbing our own fund of knowledge, we know first 
' .., - ' that the method of Socrates is to ask and answer questions (Ta $.;:' wTtx.v .I<P< t 
7 I' ./\. 
tt.7TllA"f?JV'!crc:-t."), a systematic plan f'or philosophical discussion; secondly, 
that the plan is merely to ask a definition of' same term, and then to examine 
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the answer minutely. Thirdly, we know that the name is derived from Socrates 
who originated and popularized this method. Last of all, we know that the 
purpose for which he used this method was to find out truth for himself and 
to help others find the truth. 
Having these facts, we have the four Aristotelian causes, material, 
for.ma.l, efficient, final, and we know enough to for.mula.te a. definition of the 
method, which may be stated thus: THE SOCRATIC METHOD IS AN INDUCTIVE 
SYSTEM OF QUESTION AND ANSWER FOR THE PURPOSE OF FINDING AND TEACHING A 
TRUE UNIVERSAL DEFINITION. An explanation of the individual ter.ms will be 
necessary to show the adequacy of the definition. 
First the Socratic method is ·a. system or method. Logic books de-
fine method as a. ~ea.ns of right procedure for finding the truth."l It 
therefore implies regular steps, definite rules, a. deter.mined way of going 
about finding out the truth which is being sought. The question before us 
then is, "What are the rules which Socrates follows in his method?" In gener-
al, they are the steps which may be applied to any logical system. They 
have been enumerated by Dr. Zeller in Socrates and the Socratic Schools; 
namely, (1) a. realization of ignorance in a. particular matter, (2) to search 
for knowledge of this matter, and (3) to form concepts about it.2 In as 
much as these rules are applicable to all method, they do not yet distinguish 
the Socratic from any other method, though Dr. Zeller meant them to apply 
only to the Socratic method. But when we came to consider that which is dis-
tinctive of the Socratic method, i.e., inductive questioning, we shall also 
show the specific application of these three steps to this method. 
The distinguishing note of the Socratic method Aristotle has set 
down, and very properly, as it will appear, as definition and induction: 
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Now Socrates devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was th 
first to seek a general definition of these ••• and he naturally 
inquired into the essence of these things; for he was trying to 
reason logically, and the starting point of all logical reasoning 
is the essence... There are two innovations which may fairly be 
ascribed to Socratesa inductive reasoning and general definition. 
Both of these are associated with the starti~ point of scientific 
knowledge. ~.; 0 y,J..!' errTtV ~ TIS CJ.rro {tJ/'1 ~ wi\~T£ ( 
( , ' U :> ' '\ " ' ' .:> 'f7. .. LL Q,/\.(J..I/A)SJ Tous T'-;lT~J<TI/(()VS r.o0ovs /(p~.l ro bfO'J£ITC""tl 
K.d..8o llo lf. 3 
Not only does Aristotle indicate the fundamental correctness and the logical 
value of the method, which will be examined in the next chapter, but he also 
indicates the special characteristics of the method, definition and induction. 
Sufficient confirmation of Aristotle's statement can be had by merely recall-
ing the content of some of the Socratic dialogues, many of which are nothing 
more than an attempt to find a general definition of sane virtue, by an indue 
tive examination of same pro~red definitions. Barring digressions, the 
Republic is concerned with establishing the nature of justice; the Euthyphro 
is a consideration of several definitions of holiness; the Protagoras deals 
with defining virtue in general. 
Now the kind of definition which Socrates would require is a scien-
tific or essential definition, which, as the logicians say, is formulated by 
combining genus with specific difference, just as the genus of our present 
definition of the Socratic method is SYSTEM and the specific difference is 
DEFINITION AND INDUCTION. That this is what Socrates expected of a definiti 
em 
is shown by a line from the Euthyphroa "Socrates: R~er that I did not ask 
you to give me two or three example of piety, but to explain the general idea 
which makes all things be pious. 11 4 And further tram the same dialogue we 
take this examples "Socratesa And you· appear, Euthyphro, when asked what 
holiness is, not to have been willing to make known its essence to me. n5 
In his system, then, a definition is the first thing which Socrates 
requires of his adversary. This person~ as often as not~ self-confident and 
assured~ makes nothing of the seemingly simple question which Socrates puts 
to him~ thinking it very easy to answer~ tor the definition asked is of a 
common concept~ such as of justice tor example. But unwarily Socrate~ ad-
versary may answer without much reflection according to common belief or 
opinion. He does not consider and declare the essence of the being~ but only 
the common belief about it. This is what Socrates in the dialogue Gorgias6 
calls answering according to v~os or. custom instead of according to q Jcns 
or the nature of the thing, as scientific definition requires. Such a defin-
ition, hastily given~ is very apt to be incorrect or incomplete, as most 
frequently is the case, so that it is not difficult for Socrates to trip up 
his opponent, to point out to him his error~ and thus employ the first step 
of a logical method as indicated by Dr. Zeller. 
This first step which lies in acquainting the respondent with his 
ignorance proceeds in this manner. Socrates taking the proffered definition 
begins to analyze it by applying it to many particular instances of the 
virtue in question, and quite readily finds an instance where the definition 
does not fit. For example, the definition of justice given by Polemarchus 
in the Republic - that justice is to do good to friends and ill to enemies -
can not stand, for it falls down in the case of a false friend or a mistaken 
enemy. From this practice of testing general concepts by applying them to 
particular instances, the Socratic method receives its inductive character. 
Hence Aristotle has put down induction as a distinguishing note of Socratic 
dialectic. 
The respondent being shaken in his self-reliance is now ready for 
the second step~ the search tor knowledge. The second step is like tbe first 
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socrates makes the poor fellow propose an amended definition, which is usuall 
given less confidently and only hypothetically. This new attempt Socrates 
now takes and subjects to the touchstone of concrete instances. If the 
definition is not without flaw, that is, if it is not an essential definition, 
which therefore admits no exceptions, Socrates will be sure in his scrutiny 
to find the flaw. The poor fellow has probably answered again according to 
v~I.LO.S and not according to ~.f<rt5 , for he has not yet learned how to 
formulate an essential definition. He will likely blunder on in this way 
until in despair he quits the discussion or calls upon Socrates to came to 
his rescue. Then the third step of the method has been reached, when the 
disputants begin now scientifically to form an essential definition. 
In this third step as in the second, proposed definitions are con-
sidered as hypotheses until finally established by a careful induction, but 
there is this difference, that Socrates is prepared now to confirm the hypo-
thesis and not refute it, samet~es even proposing the answer himself. When 
it is found that the hypothetical definition meets all difficulties, then 
Socrates will accept it. Often enough, however, the Socratic dialogues 
never get beyond the second step, for the original question is left unsolved, 
as in the Euthyphro, Meno, Protagoras. 
But the Socratic investigation does not stop with isolatedand dis-
connected conoeptSJ on the contrary, it synthesizes these concepts into a 
unified science, testing their coherence by the s~e process as that by which 
they were first established. This new value of the Socratic method will be 
explained in Chapter III. 
Now in all of these three steps of the method we have seen that a 
form of induction has been employed. Let us examine the nature of this in-
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duotion, for it is a characteristic of the Socratic method. Induction, of 
course, is a process of reasoning, being opposed to that other form of reason-
ing, deduction. Reasoning,in general, is a process of the mind by which we 
arrive at the unknown or less known from a consideration of what is well 
known• vVhereas deduction reasons from the better known general truth to the 
less known particular truth, as "all men are rational, therefore Plato, who 
is a man, is rational," induction proceeds from the better known particular 
instance to the less known general truth, as for example we came to know the 
existence of a cause by the observance of its effects - that there is a fire 
in the woods from the smoke curling out of the trees. Induction, of course, 
is the process we should expect Plato to use in the Socratic dialogues, since 
he is looking for a general definition which is formed by abstracting what is 
common from the inferiors under its extension. And this is exactly Socrates' 
procedure, as can be seen from a very cursory examination of anyone of the 
dialogues. He examines many particular instances for the sake of finding a 
general notion. Were he, for instance, to seek to know what justice is, he 
would consider what justice is in the shoemaker, the baker, the trainer of 
athletes, the physician, and so on. This homely, concrete, and simple method 
led same of his contemporaries to believe that he was a trifler in philosophy, 
since his language was not abstruse and unintelligible. The truth is that by 
his method he made philosophy comprehensible to the average man. 
It is to be noted, however, that though induction of this sort is 
the characteristic mark of the Socratic method, we do not mean at all to de-
clare that Socrates did not also use deduction. Pure induction, relying in 
~o wise on deduction, would prove a vain and inadequate means of advancing 
science, for the best induction is b'ased on deduction; viz., that similar 
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effects have similar causes. A good exrunple of Socratic deduction is found 
in the ~, where Socrates puts the slave boy through a rigorous course of 
geometrical deduction to establish his doctrine of reminiscence. 
Though the ,genuine value of the Socratic dialectic is for finding 
a correct solution to a probl~, neverthless a more striking feature is its 
usefulness as an argumentative device. The reader of the dialogues is for-
ever in admiration at the adroit way Socrates has of refuting his opponent, 
of confronting him with his error, of cuttillj away the very ground on which 
he stands. How does Socrates accomplish this effect? How can he, by sesm-
ingly harmless and random questions, force his adversary to gradual admiss~n~ 
that soon involve him in a contradiction? Let us try to answer these question1. 
Should we wish to know how Socrates was able to refute his adver-
sary so effectually and easily, we must understand two things, first that 
Socrates,through previous consideration of the matter of discussion, had 
became familiar with the truth and error in the matter, and second that he 
had a definite and well worked out plan of argument based on the principles 
of the syllogism. 
Socrates must certainly have came to these verbal jousts prepared. 
Not that he had foreseen and planned in advance all the turns of the debate, 
but he had at least thought often and long on the central topic, which 
usually concerned the nature of same virtue. It would be attributing more 
than genius to him to suppose that he could be so completely master of a dis-
cussion if he had never thought about its subject before. And, as a matter 
of fact, Socrates is usually the one who proposes the subject of the debate, 
whence it follows that he will choose one that is familiar to him. And in 
his advance thinking he had not been superficial. He was not satisfied to 
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accept as a definition of a concept what men commonly believed. On the con-
trary, he examined common belief (v41A.os) for himself with his own thorough 
syst~ of inductive investigation. In other words, he went through in his 
own mind much the same process as that to which he subjected his victims in 
debate. When ordinary opinion could not meet the test, he kept up investi-
gating for himself until he had either found the answer or at least discover-
ed many objections to these common opinions. That is the reason why he was 
never at a loss to urge difficulties against an adversary. 
But such complete mastery in argument would never have come to 
Socrates by mere forethought. Something else was necessary. By forethought 
he knew what reasons could be brought against his opponent, but real master-
ful argument required that he present these reasons in the most effective 
manner. As a champion dialectician he had to get the best psychological and 
dramatic effect from these reason. This he did by using a disguised and ex• 
tended syllogism with which to present his objections. 
Every reason, whether advanced to persuade or to refute, can be put 
into a syllogism. That is, it will consist of three propositions, a major 
premise, a minor premise, and the conclusion which is deduced from the pre-
mises. The major should be a statement conceded in whole or in part by the 
opposition. The same is true of the minor. But the conclusion draw.n from 
these premises should be some new proposition not previously admitted. Then 
it is the task of the opposition to show a flaw in the premises, in order to 
disprove the conclusion. But if the argument is cleverly framed, it is hard 
to find the flaw, and impossible, of course, if there is no flaw. The 
skilled controversialist, therefore, has a great advantage, and a contro-
versialist who is also on the right side, as Socrates usually was, is un-
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bea:l:iable. 
Socrates, perceiving same flaw in his adversary's statement, might 
have pointed out to him without delay the weak spot. But that would not have 
been very startling or convincing. The psychology of Socrates' method is to 
get a person to condemn himself by his own admissions. Then the impression 
will be more lasting. Instead therefore of the whole rebuttal at once, Soc-
rates feeds it out in small nibbles until the victim is ready for the hook. 
These nibbles are the admissions which the adversary concedes to Socrates, 
and are nothing more than a multiple major premise to a syllogistic objection. 
They are particular instances, concrete examples, of an abstract major, which 
because of their simplicity and seemingly harmless character, even the wary 
would readily admit. And then it is only the turn of a hand to advance as a 
minor the general principles on which these admissions are based, and the 
opponent is wide-eyed with wonder at the destruction of his argument and at 
his own foolishness. 
But Socrates' rambling syllogism is an even better device in de-
bating than the regular syllogism; it conceals better the conclusion he is 
about to establish, until at the proper moment he drops it like a bomb in his 
adversary's lap. 
Again we see the reason why the Socratic method is said to be in-
ductive. This multiple major premise of Socrates' objection is composed of 
individual applications of the same principle. From particulars, Socrates 
inters a general notion. 
One of many examples of this rambling syllogism effecting a start-
ling refutation may be found in the Meno6. Socrates refutes Meno's state-
ment that virtue is different for different classes of people; as for a man, 
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the wise management of civic affairs; for a woman, the careful management of 
the household and obedience to her husband; etc. The refutation in strict 
syllogistic form is as follows: 
MAJOR P~~ISE: Justice and temperance are required for man, woman, and child 
that they may perform their various offices virtuously. 
MINOR P~iiSE: But this is to be virtuous in the same way. 
CONCLUSION: Therefore virtue is the same for all. 
But in the dialogue Socrates gives out the major in slow stages by asking 
particular questionsa "Can a man manage the state well without justice and 
temperance? · Can a woman manage her house well without them? Can a child 
obey without them?" Meno makes no difficulty about admitting these individu-
ally, but in so doing prepares himself for defeat, for he is also implicitly 
admitting the minor. 
Considered in this light, there appears a striking likeness between 
the manner Socrates has of proposing objections and the corresponding method 
of scholastic philosophers. Both make their objection for the purpose of 
rebuttal, or, at least, to force the opposition to establish its point more 
firmly. Both use substantially the same form with this difference, however, 
that Socrates is much less formal. An analysis of a Socratic elenohy will 
best illustrate the plan of Socratic rebuttal and its similarity to the 
scholastic objection. 
In the dialogue Euthyphro, Euthyphro defines holiness for Socrates 
as attendance on or service of the gods. Socrates' refutation boiled down 
to a scholastic syllogi~ cames to this: 
MAJORa Service supposes benefit to the recipient. {Proved by analogy) 
MINOR: But man can not benefit the gods. 
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cONCLUSION& Therefore holiness is not service of the gods. 
Here is the argument as Socrates actually put ita 
SCHOLASTIC DIVISIONS 
Definition 
(Hypothesis) 
Objection 
Major 
First instance 
Second instance 
Third instance 
Further step in 
major 
Minor 
DIALOGUE 
Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me 
to be that part of justice which attends to 
the gods, as there is the other part of jus-
tice which attends to men. 
Soc. That is good, EuthyphroJ yet still there is 
a little point about which I should like to 
have further information. What is the mean-
ing of attention? For attention can hardly 
be used in the same sense when applied to 
the gods as when applied to other things. 
For instance, horses are said to require at-
tention, and not every person is able to at-
tend to them, but only a person skilled in 
horsemanship. Is that not true? 
Euth. Quite true. 
Soc. I should suppose that the art of horseman-
ship is the art of attending horses? 
Euth. Yes. 
Soc. Nor is everyone qualified to attend to dogs, 
but only the huntsman? 
Euth. Yes. 
Soc •• As the art of the oxherd is the art of at-
tending to oxen? 
Euth. Very true. 
Soc. And as holiness or piety is the art of at-
tending to the gods? - that would be your 
meaning, Euthyphro? 
Euth. Yes. 
Soc. And is not attention always designed for the 
good or benefit of that to which the atten-
tion is given? Aa in the case of horses, you 
may observe that when attended to by the 
horseman's art they are benefitted and im-
proved, are they not? 
Euth. True. 
Soc. As the dogs are benefitted by the huntsman's 
art, and the aeen by the art of the oxherd, 
and all other things are tended or not at-
tended for their good and not for their hurt 
Euth. Certainly not for their hurt. 
Soc.· But for their good? 
Euth. Certainly. 
Soc. And does not piety or holiness, which has 
been defined as .the art of attending to the 
gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say 
that when you do a holy act you make any of 
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the gods better? 
Euth. No 11 no; that is certainly not my meaning. 8 
Conclusion is 
understood 
Another mark of the Socratic method besides definition and indue-
tion is the personality of its originator. The Socratic method would not be 
complete unless it were permeated with the humor, irony11 and acuteness of 
Socrates. Though these elements do not constitute the essence of the method, 
they are at least proper notes, which can not be taken away without great 
loss to it. One has only to read any dialogue to catch the vein of gentle 
irony and pleasant banter. We quote but two examples of the many we should 
like to give. ln the following passage Socrates addresses Euthyde.mus in the 
dialogue of the same name: 
Vilult you have next to do is to give us a display of exhorting this 
youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue. But 
first I shall explain how I regard this matter and how I desire to 
hear it dealt with. If I strike you as treating it in a crude and 
ridiculous manner, do not laugh me to scorn; for in my eagerness 
to listen to your wisdom I shall venture to improvise in your pre-
sence. So both you and your disciples must restrain yourselves and 
listen without laughing.9 
And in the ~ Socrates replies to being compared to the torpedo fisha 
:I perceive your aim in thus comparing me.·' 
'What was it'l 11 
·'That I might compare you in return. One thing I know about all 
handsome people is this - they delight in being compared to same-
thing. They do well over it, since fine features, I suppose, must 
have fine similes. But I am not for playing your game. As for me, 
if the torpedo is torpid itself while causing others to be torpid, 
I am like it, but not otherwise. For it is not on account of any 
sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt; it is from being 
more in doubt myself than anyone else that I cause others to doubt. 
So now for my part I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, thoug 
perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are 
now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing 
to join with you in examining it and inquiring into its nature.lO 
Finally the definition of the Socratic method would not be complete 
unless we indicated its purposeJ namely, to find truth. "I have no particu-
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1ar liking tor anything but the truth," Socrates says in the Euthyphro.ll 
The Socratic method is not intended merely as a clever instrument tor giving 
a display of dialectical skill at the expense of same less skillfUl person 
regardless ot the truth of the conclusions reached. This was the way of the 
sophists. Their aim wa$ to make a man a skilled logician and debater so that 
he could win any case in the law courts, even making the weaker argument ap-
pear the better. Though the logical principles of the Socratic method might 
be twisted to such a use, this is not the purpose for which Socrates intended 
the method. He was anxious to discover truth and to help others discover it. 
Otten he refers to himself as a midwife helping others to bring forth ideas. 
And the pain and confusion which he caused them was not for its own sake, 
but for the sake of truth. Realizing the value of his method in the quest 
of truth, he was anxious to pass it on to others. 
To summarizea The Socratic method, like any logical method, con-
sists of three steps; first, to determine just what is known and what is not 
known; then to search for enlightment on the unknown by forming hypotheses. 
When these hypotheses have been tested and proved, and only then, will they 
be accepted. The content of the hypotheses in the Socratic method is, as a 
rule, the definition of a universal idea. The manner of testing the valid-
ity of the definition is by induction, i.e., by applying it for verification 
to many particular cases. This induction is of value not only in establish-
ing a definition but in demonstrating to an adversary his errors and in co~ 
vincing him of one's own position. 
Socrates used the method with the best psychological effect, be-
cause he understood the principles of the syllogism, on which his method like 
all dialectic is based. Confident and pugnacious adversaries were always 
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stopped short by one of his r~bling syllogisms. The major consists of par-
ticular instances of a general principle, and in this principle the minor is 
implicitly contained. Ready assent to the particular instances in the major 
was the signal of defeat, for Socrates then put forth the minor, with conse-
quent disaster to his foe. 
The purpose of the method is to discover truth. Refutation is only 
secondary. 
The chapter may best be concluded by restating the original defini-
tiona The Socratic method is an inductive system of question and answer for 
the purpose of finding and teaching true, universal definitions. 
~----------------------------------------------------------~2~4~ 
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CHAPTER III 
VALUE OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD FOR INVESTIGATING AND FINDING TRUTH 
A systematic approach is necessary to the success of any search. 
In dealing with abstract and subtle matter, the need for system increases in 
proportion to the subtlety and abstruseness of the subject. That is why 
philosophers need a method more than any other scholars. as we can readily 
see from the lack o£ it in the pre-Socratics. Without method the pre-Socra-
tics and the sophists gave up looking for truth because they thought that 
all truth was relative, since they were not able to prove conclusively any 
of their theories. Without method their philosophizing was mere speculation 
and idle theorizing, so that eventually they abandoned philosophy for the 
more utilitarian field of persuasion. 
Different schools adopted different conclusions, and any 
thinker of repute was contradicted by some other who seemed to have 
an equal claim. to be heard. Moreover, by different paths all the 
leading philosophies had led to results that directly or indirectly 
suggested scepticism as the only possible attitude towards philo-
sophic inquiry. They had all based their theories on the evidence 
of the senses; and yet nearly all had laid stress on the inadequacy 
of the senses as witnesses to the truth of things, while same had 
arrived at conclusions directly contrary to their evidence. Natur-
ally, then, the general attitude towards speculation was one of 
sceptical indifference.! 
Then Socrates appeared with a really definite method with which he was able 
to establish conclusively the few assertions that he made and to disprove 
equally conclusively the false assertions of his predecessors. In other 
words, method ushered in the use of reason in philosophy and displaced assent 
to unproved belief. 
With a little scrutiny we can see why the Socratic method was a 
valuable means of finding philosophical truth. In an investigation we seek 
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abo~e all to exhaust every possibility of gaining infor.mation and to avoid 
e~ery possibility of error. Now the Socratic method fulfills these require-
menta, as will appear. 
Every possibility of gaining information is exhausted, for the 
Socratic method employs each of the five sources of cognition, beyond which 
there can be no source of knowledge in the natural order. The testimony of 
consciousness is pressed into service in the dialogues; for example in the 
Phaedo, while seeking to establish the theory of reminiscence, Socrates asks, 
;:, / ' "Z' .) / >/ .) \ . f ""' " I 
f_l{l(f7d.jt ~vos TT£-f't WO/ rlT trT7oi.Tr:At .!J.Ot otv ODI/lf'O(t /'tOO ov 
Can a man who knows anything tell that he knows? n2 .And in the same 
argument Socrates 1 estimate of sensation as a source of knowledge is shown: 
"And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of equality, and that 
it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some 
other of the senses?"3 Frequently, too, he examines the qualities of sen-
sible objects to help him find his universal idea. The-third source, ideas, 
comes into play with recurring regularity in the Socratic method. Proof: 
the whole purpose of the method is to examine concepts and find the true uni-
versal. Socrates also relied on the authority of others for information, 
though always cautiously. In fact he made it his life's business to Learn 
from others who might be wiser than himself. In nearly every dialogue we fin 
him the humble inquirer, ironically feigning humility at time; but usually 
sincere. Yet in the Apology we read how little real knowledge he found in 
his fellows. But above all Socrates put reason to work, not just at random, 
but with such thoroughness that, according to his talent and the facts then 
at his disposal, he exhausted the possibility of this source of cognition. 
Reason,or the process of learning the less known from the better 
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known, has wider application in philosophy than any other of the five sources 
of cognition. Nor did Socrates overlook the fact that reason is twofold, 
inductive and deductive. and that he must use both types if he wished to get 
the most out of his investigatory studies. 
Induction is the process by which a general truth is drawn from 
many particular truths. Since it was Socrates chief purpose to formulate 
general definitions and universal concepts, he naturally was obliged to use 
induction principally. A consideration of same of the questions treated in 
his dialogues will show this necessity. The Republic, we have seen, is con-
cerned on the whole with defining justice; the Euthyphro deals with the 
question, ''What is holiness? 11 ; the Protagoras with, ''Vfuat is virtue?"; Laches 
~Y.hat is courage?" Examination of one of these dialogues will demonstrate 
his inductive method. The Euthyphro is the shortest and perhaps the clearest 
illustration of his method. When asked to define holiness, Euthyphro gives 
as his definition one example of holiness; namely. doing what he is doing. 
prosecuting a wrong-doer. Socrates points out the inadequacy of this parti-
cular definition. Then Euthyphro gives a definition which seams to be uni-
versal, ~Vhatever the gods love is holiness." But Socrates proves this wrong 
by showing that the gods do not agree in their love of all objects. He cites 
particular examples of cases in which both gods and men disagree about the 
right and wrong of an act, even though they admit that there is a right and 
wrong, and a nor.m or definition of holiness. Euthyphro's final definition, 
that holiness is to serve the gods, is not accepted unconditionally and there 
the dialogue ends. 
By using the second type of reasoning, deduction, going from the 
general to the particular, Socrates omits no access to truth. The Timaeus is 
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almost entirely deductive. We also see this type of reasoning employed even 
along with induction, for, as we have said in Chapter II, every induction is 
based on the general principle, similarity in individuals is the result of a 
s~ilarity in nature. To exemplify fran the Euthyphro again, we find the las 
definition of holiness questioned on the ground that it goes contrary to a 
deductive principle: the gods, as superior beings, cannot receive benefit 
from man. Therefore the definition, that holiness is to serve the gods, wan' 
stand on the ground that service implies benefit to another. Another example 
is found in the Phaedo. After establishing the principle of contradiction by 
a long induction, Socrates deduces from this principle that the soul,which is 
essentially the principle of life, can not perish because it can not admit it 
contrary, death. 
The Socratic method, then, is thorough. Zeller points out this 
quality well a 
In a similar way we see Socrates analyzing thoroughly the cammon 
notions of his friends. He reminds them of the various sides of 
every question; he brings out the opposition which every notion 
contains within itself or in relation to same other; and he aims 
at correcting by additional observations, assumptions resting on 
a one-sided experience, at completing them, and giving them a 
more careful definition.4 
The fundamental soundness of the Socratic method is shown not only 
by its understanding use of the faculty of reason, but by its similarity to 
other approved methods of more recent date. The scientific method was hailed 
with great acclaim nearly three centuries ago, and today is still admittedly 
of great worth for_its purpose. Briefly this method can be summed up in four 
stepsa (1) observation of numerous facts; (2) drawing a conclusion from these 
facts, which is put down hypothetically as an explanation of these observed 
effects; (3) testing this hypothesis by the observation of additional facts; 
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(4) elevation of the hypothesis to the dignity of a theory or law according 
to the certainty derived tram. additional experiment. The points of similarit 
between the Socratic method and the scientific method are thes$& (1) the con-
sideration of particular facts which show a common element; (2) the formula-
tion of a hypothesis to explain the common element; (3) the untiring search 
for additional facts to establish the truth of the hypothesis or of a new one 
•hich is better suited to the facts. The dissimilarity between these methods 
consists primarily in the subject dealt with. The scientific method deals 
with natural phenomena, the data of physical science, while the Socratic 
method treats of philosophical concepts. There is a slight dissimilarity in 
thit 1 too, that the Socratic method posits its hypothesis before any prelimin-
ary observation and then tests the hypothesis with individual instances. It 
assumes the initial observation as a part of the disputants' experience. 
There is yet another method to which the Socratic method bears 
great resemblance, the scholastic method, which is quite the opposite of the 
scientific method, but no less useful in its field of investigation. In the 
scholastic method facts are investigated and the truth found out not by in-
duction, but by deduction. This method consists of five steps: (1) the ac-
curate statement of the question; (2) a brief summary of the various solu-
tions to the question; (3) the statement and explanation of the correct doc-
trine (as the author sees it); (4) the proof of this doctrine by deduction; 
(5) the defense of the doctrine against all objections of adversaries. The 
points of similarity between these two methods are (1) the careful statement 
of the issue, (2) the choice of an opinion or of a well established hypothe-
sis, (3) the positive proof and subsequent defense of this position against 
all possible objections. The two methods are unlike in this that the Soc-
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ratio method presents the process by which one arrives at a conclusion, where 
as the scholastic method gives an exposition of the conclusion arrived at 
and it defense, without indicating the process by which it was reached. In 
other words, the Socratic methoq is chiefly analytic, the scholastic, synthe-
tic. 
By reason of the similarity with these two divergent methods, the 
Socratic method is a combination of the two, uniting the advantages of both. 
It brings scientific induction to philosophical questions. It uses the 
careful definition, argument, and defense of the scholastic method. 
Another advantage of the Socratic method is that it requires a dis-
cussion between two or more persons. Since "two heads are better than one," 
the possibility of error is decreased and the chances of new discovery are 
increased. A man speculating in the privacey of his study lacks the inspira-
tion of suggestion from his fellows and their restraining influence, for 
lights and objections easily occur to others that may readily be overlooked 
by the solitary thinker. Discussion naturally brings out all the aspects of 
a question, increases the understanding of all parties to that discussion. 
Again we may see the value of this method from an argument based 
on authority. l~ot to mention Xenophon and other followers of Socrates, Plato 
thought so highly of the method which he had learned from his old master, 
that he used it in his own private researches and taught it in his dialogues. 
Nor was Plato incapable of judging of the worth of his preceptor's teaching, 
for he did not hesitate to enlarge on Socratic doctrines, even change them 
when necessary. " The method of Socrates soon led Plato to regions of thougM 
far beyond its original scope and purpose. 11 5 Despite this Plato still clung 
to the method of Socrates almost to his last written work. It was only to-
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wards the end of his career that Plato abandoned the dialogue method in his 
writings, setting dawn his last three works in nearly continous discourse, 
the Timaeus, Critias, and the Laws. But we may believe that the mental 
habits acquired as a youth did not desert him in his old age, even though 
his writings did not advertise them as.much as before; that,though as an old 
man he did not favor the question and answer method as a literary vehicle, 
he had not lost any of his appreciation for it as an investigatory medium. 
No matter how excellent the Socratic method may seem theoretically, 
its true worth stands or falls on the actual results of the method. Was the 
Socratic method in the hands of Plato and Socrates productive of any real 
discoveries and new truths? That question may be answered in the affirmative 
The first of the practical fruits of this method came fram Socrates 
in the form of a series of clearly defined concepts. These concepts were 
chiefly ethical, but also political and metaphysical. So far no definite 
philosophical system may be said to have been evolved, but clear concepts 
are the basis of any system of philosophy and the necessary foundation of 
any progress to a correct system. To begin with false premises and false 
ideas is to court error in the conclusions derived therefrom. In the Socra-
tic concepts lay the beginnings of a system of epistemology and of ethics. 
But in Plato we see a complete system of philosophy evolved, a 
system that embraces "physics, dialectic, ethics, theology, and aesthetics,"6 
a system founded on the theory of Ideas. According to this theory the only 
realities are the Ideas, or the types of the sensible objects around us. 
These Ideas ascend by degrees to the highest L ,, r '"' ' e ....... Idea, Y} l 0 ~of.. Tou ~0o-. 0 u > 
the Good. Tue wisdam is a knowledge of these absolute essences, and this 
knowledge can be obtained only by use of dialectic, that is to say by use of 
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the Socratic method. That there were many errors in this system, we admit, 
and yet that many true doctrines were the result of this system can not be 
denied. Even the system itself, i.e., its fundwmental concept, that essences 
are real "a parte rei," is defended by such a great philosopher as St. Augus-
tine. He would have us believe that Plato meant that these Ideas have their 
real existence in the mind of God; and indeed Plato does say that they have 
/ / 
existence in a heavenly sphere (TOTTO:S Voytros). If this ·were Plato's real 
meaning (though most scholars following Aristotle deny it) our case would be 
that much stronger. But even admitting this error, we can point out many 
useful and true results of Plato's system. 
First of all, the theory of Ideas vms the first enuntiation of the 
universal idea and raised a problem before not considered, the problem of 
the reality of this universal. Though Plato's answer was false, he laid the 
groundwork that enabled ~istotle to give the right answer. 
Secondly, Plato, at least indirectly, propounded a doctrine much 
needed at the time and frequently denied by the sophists; namely, that truth 
is absolute. Throughout the Phaedo, Parmenides, and Republic, he insists 
that the Ideas, the eternal and absolute realities, are true. Since they 
are unchanging, truth, too, never changes. other things are true because 
they partake of these absolute entities. 
I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is 
beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute 
beauty; and this applies to everything.? 
The fundamental error of the system does not affect the validity of this 
argument, for essences are true and unchangeable whether their real, sepa-
rate existence is in the objective or subjective order. Plato's contribu-
tion in this respect has been set forth by Lutoslawskia 
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Plato reached a degree of certitude not experienced before. 
He created an ideal of infallible knowledge, far above tradi-
tional opinions, and he distinguished this scientific knowledge 
from common belief, by his ability to show a reason for each 
assertion. The methodical connection of thought gave to his 
conclusions a permanence and consistency which unscientific 
opinion never reaches.s 
Plato's third important addition to philosophy is the defense of 
the existence and immortality of the soul. The soul exists because man knows 
the Ideas, abstract and intangible to the senses. But the body can not know 
them. So there must be a spiritual soul which knows them. In the Phaedo 
he askst 
Now about such things as this, S:immias. Do we think there is such 
a thing as absolute justice or not? ••• And absolute beauty and 
goodness? ••• Is their true nature contemplated by means of 
the body?9 
The answer is not by means of the body, but by the soul. 
The immortality of the soul is defended by five ,arguments in the 
Phaedo. Of these arguments, one at least is valid: the soul, since it knows 
the Ideas, is like them, simple and uncompounded; therefore it can not fall 
into corruption and perish. Nor was the immortality which Plato preached a 
vague existence not calculated to win any man's belief or desire. Rather he 
thought of the future life nearly in terms of our Christian beatitude. 
"But how shall we bury you?" 
"However you please," he replied, "if you can catch me and I do 
not get away from you." And he laughed gently, and looking 
towards us, said: "I can not persuade Crito, my friends, that 
the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details 
of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one wham he 
will presently see a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And 
though I have been saying at great length that after I drink 
the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to 
joys of the blessed you know of, he see.ma to think that was talk 
uttered to encourage you and myself.'~O 
But perhaps the most important of the ideas arrived at by Plato 
through his dialectic method is his doctrine of "the good." The highest of 
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all the Ideas, the culmination of man's search for knowled~e and happiness 
\ , /\ , 
is TO cx0txC?o v • Some authors would have us believe that Plato identified 
\ " , ro d..'t""ebv with our concept of God. Bishop Turner goes so far as to say, 
"The only rational interpretrtion of Plato's doctrine of the g;ood is that 
by the Idea of good Plato meant '}od Himself • 11 11 Vfuether this is so or not, 
' ) r 
at least Plato's concept of TO ~0cJ..Bov conforms in several notes to our 
idea of' Sod. In the Philebus, he ree.sons to the existence of e. creator from 
the necessity of such a bF':ing in view of the order in the universe. In the 
" Republic, TO " L'l / t:J.([{).OOV is explained as that which when possessed gives com-
plete he.p~iness. This is strikinslY like our concept of God e.s the final 
cause. For e. pa~an to have come even so close to the Christian notion of 
God, no matter how var;uely, argues well for the virtue of his life, the 
clarity and depth of his understandinc;, and the ve.lue of his method of reason-
ing. 
The e.rcuments then that urge the value of the Socratic method in 
searchin1~ for and finding the truth are briefly these. Theoretically the 
method is sound, for it enlists in its search all of the five sources of 
hu..rnan cognition. In its use of the chief source, reason, it is exhaustive, 
for it employs both types of reason, deduction and especially induction. 
Lc;ain, the intrinsic worth of the method is shovm by the closeness with which 
both the hi~hly successful scholastic and scientific methods imitated it. 
Its che.racter of mutual discussion is an added merit. But practically the 
worth of the Socratic method is demonstrated by the success Socrates and 
Plato enjoyed from its use. -,nth it Socrates laid down a series of clear 
concepts about virtue and the origin of knowledge, thus setting up the begin-
nings of a system of epistemology and ethics. Plato vms more succesful, pro-
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ducing the highly idealistic and beautifUl system built on the theory of 
Ideas. Though the system has been proved false in some points, it is never-
theless responsible for many valuable doctrines: the doctrine of the univer-
sal idea and its true solution by Aristotle; the establishment of the abso-
lute character of truth in opposition to the relativistic attitude of the 
sophists; the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; above all, the first 
sketch of a theodicy. 
Valuable as the Socratic method seems, we are far from contending 
that it is flawless or without its dangers. But these short-comings are 
merely accidental and not of its essence. One of these dangers arises from 
its inductive character. Many of the arguments used are of analogy. Now 
analogies are only illustrations and not conclusive proofs. Used as such 
they are helpful, but when used as proofs - provided that the similarity of 
of the analogous objects is not essential - the argument is merely eristic. 
Plato, though he seems to have realized this danger, was not without sin in 
this matter. In the Gorgias, he points out the error of such an argument 
when he rejects Callicles' proof fran analogy that "might makes right. 11 Yet 
he falls into the error himself in the Republic, for he tries to show that 
women should be warriors in his perfect state by the analogy that female dogs 
make war alongside of the males. In another example from the Republic, Soc-
rates is seeking to disparage his opponents definition of justice: 
··Is not he who can best strike any kind of a blow whether fighting 
or boxing best able to ward off any kind of blow1" 
acertainly. :• 
And he who can prevent or elude a disease is best able to create 
one? 
True. 
And he is best guard of a position who is best able to steal a 
march on the enemy? 
Certainly. 
Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief? 
That~ I suppose, is to be inferred. 
Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at 
stealing. 
So the argument declares. 
Then the just man has turned out to be a thief.l2 
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"Nothing,"says Father Clarke~ "can give a better notion of the extreme dan-
ger of arguing from a f~v plausible instances than the ingenious employment 
of it by the Athenian philosopher (Socrates.)"l3 
Balancing, however, the shortcomings of the method against its 
merits~ there can be no doubt which outweighs the other. Its value has been 
neatly summarized by Barker: 
It was a definite method, as much (we may almost s~y) as the 
scholastic method of the t1iddle Ages; There were rules for the 
adoption of the theme of discussion, and rules of the relevant 
answering of the question. It was a method unpleasant for the 
victimc and a method which might became merely eristic, turning 
the argument in any way for the sake of argument; but it was, 
all the same, in the hands of Socrates, a genuine organ of truth.l4 
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CHAPTER IV 
LITERARY VALUE OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Plato's adoption of the Socratic method has been justi-
fied, it is hoped, fram a philosophical point of view• Now we shall see whe-
ther this method 4id not contribute something more to Plato's writings, a 
literary value. That Plato's works were literary gems is the opinion of all 
critics, as of Bishop Turnera 
But whatever may be our judgment as to the value of his philo-
sophy, no adverse criticism can detract from his preeminent 
claim to the first place among masters of philosophical style. 
Even though we refuse to call him " profound 11 , we cannot but 
subscribe to the verdict by which all ages agreed to give him 
the titles divine and sublime. Subsequent speculation, sub-
sequent discovery, and subElequent increase in the facilities 
for acf!uiring knowledge have corrected:much:that:Plato:t~ught 
and added much to what he said, and yet not a. single master 
has appeared who could drewn of rivaling, not to say excelli 
ing the literary perfection of his philosophical dialogues. 
It remains for us to show that the Socratic method contributed in same way 
to this literary preeminence. 
We make the assertion, then, that the use of the Socratic 
method did add to the literary brightness of Plato's works. The subjects 
on which he chose to write necessarily limited his literary style, but he re-
moved the obstacle, as well as it may be removed, by the use of the Socratic 
method. Not that we claim that the mere use of the Socratic method has of 
itself alone produced this effect, no more than we would claim that the use 
of the form of St. Thomas could enable a mediocre philosopher to write the 
Summa. But just as the use of St. Thomas' method would help even the medio-
ore to present his thoughts more effectively, so the Socratic method ia a 
device which Plato, in his genius, chose as an aid to that genius. 
In what way does the Socratic method contribute literary 
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value to Plato's dialogues? It supplies at least five of the six principles 
of composition. Vfe shall follow the division of Arlo Bates, which seems 
both sufficiently inclusive and at the same time mutually exclusive. There 
are three principles of structure and three principles of quality. To quote 
Bates' words: "The three ~inciples of Structure-the mechanical principles, 
so to say, those which direct most obviously the mechanics of language-are 
Unity, Mass, and Coherence. The three Principles of Quality-those which go-
vern the inner and more intellectual character of a composition-are Clearnes, 
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Force, and Elegance." All but the last named quality, Elegance, are enhan-
ced by the use of the Socratic method. 
Of the principles of structure, unity is the first. Uni-
ty is furthered by the Socratic method, since it is according to the require-
ments of the method that the state of the question be early established and 
strictly adhered to. Thus one central topic is discussed to the end without 
useless deviation. Some of the dialogues that seem to lack unity are the 
Phaedo, Protagoras, and Republic. But this lack is only apparent, for a 
little study of these dialogues reveals their complete oneness. The Phaedo, 
it is sometimes said, centers about the question of the immortality of the 
soul, and again about the theme, " the philosopher should be glad to die. 11 
But the one theme is merely a corollary to the other. Socrates, in a leng-
thy discussion with his friends, shows why he, like a good philosopher, is 
not afraid to dri~ the cup of hemlock, because he looks to a happier exis-
tence in the next world. His arguments, therefore, in support of the soul's 
immortality are very much to the point. The Protagoras, with its myths and 
long speeches, seems to wander from the central topic, the acquisition of 
virtue. But even the wordy profusions of Protagoras, Prodious, and Hippias 
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all bear upon that main topic and fit into the pattern. The Republic, how-
ever it may seem to digress, is really remarkable for unity. The main idea, 
the nature of justice, is carried ever forward in the discussions, whether 
they be of the nature of the perfect state, the nature of the Ideas, or the 
future life, for they are merely exemplifying the most perfect form of justice 
(as Plato thought) in a corporate body, the state, the means of attaining 
justice, and the reward of justice. 
Coherence is clearly one of the fruits of the Socratic method. For 
coherence means the proper ordering of thought, be that order chronological, 
topographical, climactic, or logical •. Especially in philosoplrical works, 
and all works of argumentation, the natural order will be the logical order. 
But the Socratic method is nothing more than dialectic, a logical system, and 
logic is but the ordering of thought. Consequently the Socratic method pre-
eminently produces coherence in the dialogues. 
Mass, the third structural principle, co~only called emphasis 
(but ivrongly it seams), is the principle governing the proper proportioning 
of matter and treatment to the importance of the ideas. In the dialogues, 
the important ideas are the ones that need most clarification. Now it is the 
nature of the Socratic dialectic to remain on a point until it is examined 
fran all sides and thoroughly elucidated. So the important ideas, the ones 
that need most examination, are naturally given the due amount of stress. 
In the Phaedo, for example, two arguments for the innn.ortality of the soul, .. 
the argument from generation from opposites and the argument from the insoci-
ability of contraries, seam to one of the interlocutors to contradict each 
other. Clearly the arguments should receive more attention than the objectio 
To these two arguments, the~, Plato devotes sections 70 - 72 and 100 - 107; 
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but the objection he answers in a paragraph, section l03B: 
You do not observe the difference between the present doctrine 
and what we said before. We said before that in the case of con-
crete things opposites are generated fro.m opposites; whereas now 
we say that the oabstract concept of an opposite can never be-
come its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. 
Then we were talking about things which possess opposite quali-
ties and are called after them, but now about those very op-
posites the immanence of which gives the things their names. 
Though the Socratic method naturally aids the user to observe the 
three principles of structure, almost any method does the same; yet the Soc-
ratio method goes beyond other methods in that it is largely responsible in 
the dialogues for at least two of the principles of quality, clearness and 
force. The principles of quality are different fram those of structure be-
cause they create an appeal, an appeal to intellect, amotion, and imagination. 
vlhatever work interests a reader may be said to touch him in one 
of three ways: it may appeal to his understanding, to his emotions, 
or to his imagination. In other words, it may affect him by its 
intellectual, by its emotional, by its imasinative or aesthetic 
quality. Bearing in mind that any nomenclature is a matter of 
convenience, and that we use names chiefly as a means of dividing 
the subject into portions which may be handled less awkwardly 
than the whole, we may call these three qualities Clearness, 
Force, and Eleganoe.3 
Interest or appeal then are the qualities which we shall now look for in the 
dialogues, and the extent to which they are increased by the Socratic method. 
Clearness, joined with the innate interest of the subject, consti-
tutes the intellectual appeal. Clearness is to the intellect what light is 
to the eye. The eye can not perceive the largest mountain right in front of 
it if there is no light to illuminate the mountain. Similarly the intellect 
can not grasp the mountain of meaning that may be packed in such a work as 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, shall we say, without the light of clearness 
shining upon it. But even abstruse philosophical subjects can be made clear 
when they are treated as Plato treats them with the Socratic method. 
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First of the means to obtain clearness is the thorough and deliber-
ate development of each thought. Plato's reasoning moves leisurely £ram step 
to step, so that each point may sink into the mind. And time is necessary 
to comprehend difficult matters, even though the idea be lucidly declared in 
a second. That is not enough. Beginners and ordinary people need a period 
of reflection before they make a deep thought their own, no matter how clear-
ly it is put. This consideration for the groping mind, this division of 
thought into its simplest components, is admirably demonstrated in the Meno. 
Socrates is questioning the slave boy to show that he has a knowledge of 
geometry by recollection from a previous existence: 
Tell me, boy, do you know that a square figure is like this? 
I do. 
Now a square figure has these lines, four in number, all equal? 
Certainly. 
And these, drawn through the middle, are equal too, are they not? 
Yes. 
And a figure of this sort may be larger or smaller? 
To be sure. 
Now if this side were two feet and that also two, how many 
feet would the whole be? Or let me put it thus: if one way 
it were two feet, and only one foot the other, of course the 
space would be two feet taken once? 
Yes. 
But as it is two feet also on that side, it must be twice tvro 
feet? 
It is. 
Then. the space is twice two feet? 
Yes. 
Well how many ~e twice two feet? Count and tell me. 
Four, Socrates. 
And so throughout the rest of the demonstration. Not only does the discus-
sion move slowly enough for even the unskilled to comprehend, but the inter-
locutor has a chance, and in his person the reader, to ask questions and have 
vague points cleared up: 
Then one of those present - I don't renember just who it was - said: 
11 In Heaven's name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite 
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of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater 
is generated tram the less and the less from the greater and 
that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But 
now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen." 5 
Another means of procuring clearness is by repetition of 
a thought, a means which Plato employs frequently. Like the step by step de-
velopment of the last paragraph, repetition of an idea increases the likeli-
hood of comprehension. To exemplify we turn to the Euthydemusa 
Come now, of things that are, what sort do we hold to be really 
good? Or does it appear to be no difficult matter and no proe-
lem for an important person, to find here too a ready answer? 
Anyone will tell us that to be rich is good, surely? 
Quite true, he said. 
Then it is the srune with being healthy and handsome, and having 
other bodily endowments in plenty? 
He agreed. 
Again, it is surely clear that good birth and talents and dis-
tinctions in one's own country are good things. 
He admitted it. 
Then what have we still remaining, I asked, in the class of 
goods? VJhat of being tei!lperate, and just, and brave? I pray 
you tell me, Cleinias, do you think we shall be right in rank-
ing these as goods, or in rejecting them? For it6may be that someone will dispute it. How does it strike you? 
Plato uses yet another and more effective way of gaining 
clearness in his dialogues, illustration. Examples and analogies are the 
ever present lamps that ill~ the shadO'VIry turns of his thought. And most 
important of all, Plato uses language that is simple and concrete. Shunning 
the abstract terms and reasoning that most philosophers fall into by reason 
of their subject, Plato robes his thought in language simple enough for the 
artisans of Athens to understand, yet deep enough in content to occupy the 
lifelong rumination of St. Augustine. To illustrate this simplicity, concre-
teness, and clarification by example, we take a passage fram the Republica 
I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that 
a horse has same end? 
I should. 
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And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which 
could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any 
other thing? 
I do not understand, he said. 
Let me explain& Can you see, except with the eye? 
Certainly not. 
Or hear, except with the ear? 
No. 
These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs? 
They may. 
But you can out off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, 
and in many other ways? 
Of course. 
And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose? 
True. 
l~y we not say that this is the end of a pruning hook? 
We may. 
Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my 
meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything 
would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well 
accomplished, by any other thing?7 
In fact this simplicity seemed crude and unbecoming to the Athenian intelli-
gentsia, though their wring-minded opinions did not affect Socrates' or Plato' 
use of it, nor lessen its worth. Alcibiades in the Symposium gives a picture 
of the homely character of Socrates' discussion• 
If anyone will listen to the talk of Socrates, it will appear 
to him at first extremely ridiculous. He is always talkiag 
about great market-asses, and brass founders, and leather 
cutters, and skin dressers; and this is his perpetual custom, 
so that any dull and unobservant person might easily laugh at 
his discourses. 8 
Simple they are, but for that very reason they have a high place in the lit-
erature of the world. 
To this point perhaps, Plato has not exceeded other eminent philo-
sophers in the written presentation of his thoughts; but when we consider 
the qualitative principles, force,and elegance, we shall see where Plato's 
superiority lies. other philosophers may want nothing in worthwhile ideas to 
communicate, in unity of subject, and coherence of arrangement. In fact 
philosophical writings are famous for their importance of content and order-
.. 
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liness of procedure. A philosopher naturally writes that way. His long 
training in intellectual pursuits, in analysis, in classification, in deep 
penetration have fitted him for this carefulness in writing. But his train-
ing does not fit him for literary preeminence, as most philosophical disqui-
tions reveal. Still philosophy and literary style are not repugnant, and 
the introduction of emotion and imagination into such works, however diffi-
cult to achieve, is no de.merit but a positive advantage. That is where 
Plato's genius shines forth. That is what makes his dialogues so enjoyable 
and interesting. 
Force, or the e.motional interest of the dialogues, is also a re-
sult in part of the Socratic method. 
The dialogues have often been called dramatic dialogues, and it is 
this dramatic character that primarily adds to their forcefulness. Drama is 
a human conflict, and in the dialogues there is an ever present conflict -
in an intellectual sphere, it is true - but not of mere abstractions. A 
notable example of this we find in the Republic, where Socrates and the surly 
and confident Thrasymachus (with no little heat on the part of Thrasymachus) 
take the field in defense of what each considers justice. The dialogues 
always have something of the nature of a fight, even when the discussion is 
not so animated, so that even the bystander or reader takes sides with the 
protagonists. The interest which these discussions had for the disciples 
of Socrates is explained by that eminent jouster in his Apolo&¥: 
But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with 
me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the 
whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are ex-
amined who think they are wise and are not so; tor it is enter-
taining. Jcrrl od.f DVK ~Ot..S. 9 
Humor is one of the strongest emotional appeals of literature. It, 
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too, is characteristic of the Socratic method, and lends much interest to the 
dialogues. Usually the type of humor found is irony, though often enough it 
is supplied by a pleasantry or passing joke or by a humorous comparison. In 
the Republic, Socrates says to Thrasymachus, "And do you imagine that I am 
such a madman as to try to cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion~lO 
Plato's appreciation of the value of humor is apparent from a passage in the 
Philebus: "~vcf..rr~vADI. g;_f7, ;;; /Jf~Tr_xc, TYj's r:rlTou{;;-; 0jv~7ou ~v/~r~ ( r/ 
.-, 7To< 1 0 t tX.. Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from 
serious talk.nll But irony is such a characteristic of Socrates that the 
term Socratic Irony has become a canm1onplace in literary parlance. Sometimes 
it is mild and gentle, sometimes cutting and caustic, but almost always pre-
sent. The whole thing revolves about the point that Socrates, who claims not 
to know anything, is the one who really has wisdom, while his adversary, who 
willingly admits that he has knowledge, is found to know next to nothing. 
There is a very gentle hint of irony in this passage from the Protagoras: 
I used formerly to think that there was no human treatment by 
which the good were made good, but now I am convinced (by Pro-
tagoras) that there is. Only I find one slight difficulty, which 
Protagoras will of course easily explain away, since he has ex-
plained so many puzzles already.l2 
But the irony is not nearly so veiled in the following excerpts. Socrates 
says to Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus: 
If I may advise you, beware of talking before a number of people, 
lest they learn the whole thing (the art of winning any argument, 
true or false) in a trice and give you no credit for it. The 
best thing for you is to talk to each other by yourselves, in 
private; failing that, if a third person is present, it must 
be someone who will pay you a good fee. lUld if you are prudent, 
you will give this same counsel to your pupils also - that the~ 
are never to converse with anybody except you and each other.l 
And in the Republic, Socrates addresses Thrasy.machus: 
Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, 
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is the interest of the stronger. 1Vhat, Thrasymachus, is the 
meaning of this? You can not mean to say that because Polydwmus, 
the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating 
of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is 
therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and 
right and just for us?l4 
The last of the principles of quality, elegance, is present in the 
dialogues, but this quality, frankly, can not be attributed to the Socratic 
method or to anything else but to a natural gift. Elegance, the imaginative 
or aesthetic appeal of literature, is the hardest to define, and the most 
intangible. Same call it beautyi others, charm; still others, grace. How 
a person may put it into his writing is equally hard to tell. It can be in-
creased by practice and observation, but can not be explained by rule. It 
is like taste, something innate, differing in every man. That it is present 
in the dialogues is an indisputable fact. They have charm, grace, beauty, 
elegance, or what you will. No one denies it. But since this is a natural 
gift, not acquired, we can not say it is a result of the Socratic method or 
of any other set of rules, so we leave it there. 
So far we have considered in general how the Socratic method pro-
fits Plato in a literary way. But these principles of structure and quality 
apply equally to all types of literature, whether of poetry or of prose. 
Considering now the particular type of Plato's dialogues, exposition, we 
shall see whether there is not same peculiar value which the Socratic method 
adds to this type. 
Exposition is intended to instruct the reader or hearer. Education 
is its end. Socrates teaching the Athenians what virtue is and how to find 
it, Plato teaching them a complete system of philosophy for making their 
lives happier, fell into exposition as the natural literary type for their 
purpose of instruction. The best method which they found for imparting know-
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ledge was the dialectic syste.m we call the Socratic method. Dr. Zeller says: 
For Socrates, this mode of intercourse has not merely an educa-
tional value, procuring easier access and more fruitful effect 
for his ideas, but it is to his mind an indispensable condition 
to the development of thought.l5 
And what applies to Socrates applies as well to his pupil Plato, as is evident 
from his constant use of this method. 
The question is why has the Socratic method this value. The answer: 
It conforms to the general canons of effective writing and in particular it 
is based on sound psychological principles of pedigogy. 
The chief interest of the pedigogue is clarity and interest in his 
presentation. Without them he can not hope to bridge the gap between his 
mind and his pupil's. With the.m he clothes his ideas in an attractive aura 
which relieves the drudgery of learning, speeds up the process of comprehen-
sion, and stimulates the student to greater efforts. 
Following the canons for all effective writing, Plato obtains these 
qualities of clarity and interest. Clarity results from his unified, coher-
ent., well proportioned discourses., which contain the qualities of simplicity., 
illustration., and repetition. Interest comes from an appeal to emotion and 
imagination - from the drwmatic and humorous quality of his writings, and 
from his fine appreciation of the beautiful in language. But there are par-
ticular means, elements of the Socratic method., by which Plato stimulates 
interest. These means are the sound psychological principles of the Socratic 
method. 
First of all, Socrates or Plato wins the interest of the other 
party to the discussion., and through him of the reader, by gentle encourage-
ment and harmless flattery of his ego. Everyone likes to have his opinion 
asked. So when Socrates asks one of his fellows to tell him the nature of 
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justice or virtue or holiness, that person, feeling his own importance, eager-
ly attempts to supply the information. A humorous instance of Socrates' 
deference to others occurs in the Euthyphroa 
Then the best thing for me, my admirable 1uthyphro, is to become 
your pupil, and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to chal-
lenge him and say that I always thought it very important before 
to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am 
doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovation in matters 
of religion, I have become your pupil. And "Meletus," I should 
say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, 
then believe me that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring 
me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a 
suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me~l6 
Then having won the attention of his pupil, Socrates gives him an 
active part in the instruction that follows. Passive reception makes learn-
ing dull and difficult. To counteract this passivity, Socrates keeps the 
mind of the pupil occupied by making him. a party to the investigation, requir-
ing his opinion at every step. "Socrates," says M.E.J. Taylor, ''would not save 
people the trouble of thinking for themselves, but he showed them how to 
think, by thinking things out with them in conversation.nl7 And this is the 
best way of teaching after all. For what a person discovers for himself makes 
a stronger impression than that which he hears from another. In fact Socrates 
scarcely seemed the teacher, but a sort of humble assistant in the process of 
learning. He refers to himself as a midwife to the ideas of another, not as 
the father of those ideas. He thought it better to assist others in the tra-
vail with ideas than to be the cause of those ideas in them. From the Theae-
tetus ·· -,"te shall quote but one of the frequent allusions to himself in this 
capacity of midwifea "All that is true of the art of midwifery is true also of 
mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and 
in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies. ttl8 Socrates, no doubt, 
would not approve of our present lecture system in philosophy. 
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Another way Socrates has of arousing the interest of his pupils in 
knowledge is to upset their complacency, to show them how inaccurate is their 
own knowledge. Not merely showing them how to arrive at knowledge, he stimu-
lates them to seek it for themselves by demonstrating their own deficiencies. 
True, not all took kindly to the expose of their ignorance, but those who were 
wise and capable of wisdom were anxious for guidance along the arduous path 
of wisdom. We find an example of this disruption of a pupil's self-satis-
faction in the Meno: 
I consider, Socrates, that both in your appearance and in other 
respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo seafish; for 
it benumbs anyone who approaches it, and something of the sort 
is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel 
my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what 
answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made 
abundant speeches on virtue to various people - but now I can 
not say one word as to what it is.l9 
Meno was not as docile in his ignorance as he should have been for his own 
good, but at least he was made to distrust his own wisdom. 
In conclusion, then, Plato not only had Un.portant and worthwhile 
doctrines to teach, but he knew how to present them as a masterful teacher. 
Combining his mvn genius with the method which he received from his master, 
Socrates, he gave us philosophical essays, the literary merit of which has 
not been surpassed to our own day. The effectiveness of his presentation is 
derived from his literary ability and from his understanding use of correct 
psychology in education. Plato adheres closely to the principles of structure 
and to the important principles of quality, .for he who uses the Socratic 
method is under a natural necessity of following them. He demonstrates his 
ability as a teacher by winning immediate effort and attention of his pupil, 
by keeping that pupil active in the investigation of their problem, and by 
pulling him out of the mire of self-satisfaction. We do not think that 
A. ~. Taylor has estimated Plato's ability too highlya 
Plato is the one man in history who has combined supreme great-
ness as a philosophic thinker with equal greatness as a master 
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of language, and so has been, directly or indirectly, the teacher 
of thinking men since his awn day.20 
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CF..APTER V 
THE EFLUE'TI'CE OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Just as the acorn grows into the stately oak, from V'rhich in turn 
may grow many acorns and many oaks, until we know not what forests of trees 
have arisen from that original seed, so a seedling idea, containing within 
itself potentialities for countless offspring, may extend its germ of life 
through the world of thou~ht, even thou~h the ori~inal parent be long for-
o:otten. That is something of the function a....nd fate of the Socratic method. 
Until Socrates, an occasional philosopher had formed in~e~ious and 
sometimes brilliant hypotheses, but their thought was undisciplined and spo-
ra.dic. Philosophy vras going astray and losing its way for want of method. 
Then came Socrates with his method as a harness to unbridled thought. He 
brought philosophy back to the highroad, a;ivin~ it new direction and new cer-
titude. His method schooled men in the principles of logic~ upon which rest 
all sure assent to a proposition. It demanded exact and exhaustive investi-
cr:ation of every hypothesis. It showed the way to syllogistic ree.soning, the 
most accurate and certain expression of truth. It disting;uished the two types 
of reasoning, induction and deduction, the means by wiich all human science 
may be excogitated. Thow;h subsequent study developed these processes more 
fully and more accurately, they were all, nevertheless, contained in germ iE 
the Socratic method. And thus, since it accustomed men to thinking logically, 
correctly, and purposefully, it was the unrecognized and indirect, perhaps, 
but none the less real parent of all other systems of knowledge. 
Socrates, the origircator of method, realized its necessity and ill-
sisted upon its usefulness. Though he mi~ht know nothing else, he claimed to 
if 
know bow to arrive at knowled.~e, e.nd was se.tisfied tha\he tnua;ht at least 
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the method to truth he had done something worthwhile. That his efforts were 
not without result is evident from the influence he had upon his contempor-
aries and upon succeeding ages. 
The first and most direct influence of the Socratic method was on 
the followers of Socrates. Of these the most ~portant was Plato, who was 
the most accurate and scientific recorder of the method of his master. Plato 
used the method very extensively in his investigation and his writings, and 
to good effect, we may say, for men still hail h~ as one of the world's 
greatest philosophers and writers. other of Socrates' followers who used 
and popularized the Socratic method in their writings were Xenophon, Antis-
thanes, founder of the school of Cynics, Aristippus, founder of the Cyreniac 
school, and Aeschines, the orator. I~ny of their dialogues have been lost. 
But the greatest man to use the Socratic method was Aristotle, the 
mightiest of pagan philosophers. Though in his preserved writings Aristotle 
did not use the dialectic form, he did in his earlier career write dialectic 
dialogues, which we do not possess today. Now Aristotle learned the Socratic 
method from Plato, whose pupil he was. Undoubtedly his early association 
with Plato and his early dialectic writing instilled in him mental habits 
which stayed with him the rest of his life, and to which he owes much of his 
success. His clear and excellent treatises on logic have their beginnings, 
very likely,in the Socratic dialectic. And all his success in other branches 
of philosophy can be said to have been conditioned by the discipline his 
genius received from an excellent teacher in an excellent method. 
Since scholasticism is indebted so deeply to Aristotle, it is also 
indebted indirectly to Plato and Socrates for the training they gave him. 
And indeed the scholastic method bears no little resemblance to the Socratic 
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method, as we have shown above. Though the scholastkmethod is more detailed 
and more clearly defined than the Socratic method, the influence of the 
earlier is easily apparent. The careful examination of a question, the solu-
tion of all objections, the careful proof of the thesis, are common to both 
methods. 
The influence of the Socratic upon the scientific method is not as 
easily traced historically as the influence of the Socratic upon the schol-
astic~ but the similarity is even greater. The Socratic method applied to 
questions of physical science would be substantially the scientific method 
as we find it today. The careful examination of similar particulars~ the 
formulation of a hypothesis as an explanation of the cause of this similarity~ 
the testing of the hypothesis with additional observation, all are found in 
either system. It only took the transfer of interest fr6.m philosophy to 
physical science centuries later to show additional value of the Socratic 
method~ even though it be called by another name~ and even though its ad-
vocates did not realize the antiquity of their method. 
Such has been the influence of the Socratic method in the past. 
And even today from the study of it we may draw profit~ not only for philo-
sophy and science, but for literature and education. The philosopher, indeed, 
will learn from it how to conduct an investigation for himself, the value of 
clearly defined concepts, and how to form the.m by sifting accidental from 
the essential. The student of physical science, also, will gain a better 
understanding from studying the Socratic method of the method especially 
adapted to those sciences. The student of literature and the hopeful author 
may learn many things, above all the advantage and manner of appealing to 
all the faculties, intellect, emotion, and imagination. The educator, too, 
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may pick up many principles of his calling by observing Socrates' ways - the 
p~inciples of clarity and interest, above all, which came fram simplicity 
and concrete illustration, fram drawing ideas from the student through his 
active participation in the investigation, rather than from driving ideas 
into his head. 
Thanks to the Socratic dialogues of Plato, then, this valuable 
method has influenced the thought of all the innumerable students of philo-
sophy and physical science in the western world. Its influence has and will 
be, moreover, extended to the fields of literature and education.. Like the 
little acorn from which has sprung the mighty oak forest, this method has 
been the partial cause of systems and movements of unlimited extent, and 
will continue to live in the spark of life by which new systems take exis-
tence fram the old. 
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